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Abstract
The Past Hypothesis defended by David Wallace in his 2011 ac-
count of macroscopic irreversibility is technically distinct from, but in
the same spirit as, that of David Albert in his 2000 book Time and
Chance. I am concerned in this essay with the role of objective prob-
ability in both accounts, which I find obscure. Most of the analysis
will be devoted to the classical treatments by both authors, but a fi-
nal section will question whether Wallace’s quantum version involving
unitary dynamics removes this obscurity.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Preliminaries 2
3 Albert’s past hypothesis 6
4 Comments on Albert’s contraption 8
5 Wallace’s contraption 15
6 Comments on Wallace’s contraption 18
∗To appear in The Quantum Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, D. Bedingham, O.
Maroney and C. Timpson (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2017.
†harvey.brown@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
1
7 Probability 27
8 Quantum theory 33
9 Acknowledgments 38
10 References 38
1 Introduction
In his remarkable recent work on the foundations of statistical mechanics,
David Wallace has urged that there is more to the theory than just recover-
ing thermodynamics, and that lessons need to be learnt from the quantita-
tive way practitioners of statistical mechanics go about accounting for the
spontaneous process of equilibration in isolated systems.1 I endorse these
claims, and think Wallace’s detailed 2011 treatment of irreversibility, of the
subtle business of accounting for the thermodynamic arrow of time in statis-
tical mechanics, deserves careful attention. Although clearly influenced by
David Albert’s formulation of the Past Hypothesis in his 2000 monograph
Time and Chance, Wallace goes beyond Albert’s account, not just by pro-
viding a more detailed mechanism for irreversibility, but by bringing unitary
quantum mechanics into the picture in parallel with classical mechanics. In
doing so, he questions the widespread notion that the relevant conceptual
problems appear in the same guise in both classical and quantum statistical
mechanics.
In this paper, I will concentrate mostly on the classical accounts of irre-
versibility offered by the two Davids. I will try to articulate my misgivings
about both versions of the past hypothesis, my main qualms having to do
with the role probability plays in these arguments. At the end of the paper
I raise the question as to how much of Wallace’s classical analysis survives
in the light of his quantum analysis. To this end, I examine the treatment
of the “irreversible” thermalization process associated with a quantum field
theoretic version of Boltzmann’s H -theorem.
2 Preliminaries
In order to set the stage, I would first like to recall some of the basic con-
ceptual issues that arise when dealing with the arrow of time in a theory
1See Wallace (2015a).
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with time-symmetric dynamics, as I see them. I start with the following
statements made by David Wallace and Jos Uffink respectively:
“It is virtually tautologous that if microscopic physics has no
time asymmetry but the emergent macroscopic dynamics does
have a time asymmetry, that time asymmetry must be due to an
asymmetry in the initial conditions of the universe.”2
“. . . a clear and commonly accepted answer on the question how
to explain irreversible phenomena in statistical mechanics has
not been reached.”3
One might quibble with the suggestion that initial conditions can be
“asymmetric”, but it is fairly clear what Wallace means in the first state-
ment. Given that the fundamental micro-dynamical laws are time reversal
invariant, it should be obvious that the time asymmetry ubiquitously dis-
played in the behaviour of macroscopic systems cannot be explained in terms
of these laws alone. The explanation – if that is the right word – must incor-
porate something like boundary/initial conditions of the system in question,
and I will take this simple point for granted from now on. It might seem
odd then that according to Uffink, the explanation enjoys no consensus in
the literature. What can the debate be about? I will not attempt any so-
ciological analysis of the matter, but raise a number of issues that come to
mind.
First, there is the question as to whether the initial conditions of the uni-
verse (with or without inflation) are disagreeably “fine-tuned”, thus them-
selves calling for an explanation. A further question is whether such an
explanation is possible in principle. A positive answer to this last ques-
tion could only make sense in the context of a multiverse scenario, and this
involves more speculation than I feel comfortable with in the present essay.4
Second, it may seem arbitrary, given our fundamental understanding of
determinism in physics, that the conditions specified in the putative expla-
nation of entropic behaviour are the initial ones. If determinism is, at root,
related to the existence of a Cauchy “initial” value problem, the Cauchy data
can in principle lie on any space-like hypersurface, even one to the “future”
2Wallace (2011).
3Uffink (2013).
4For a critique of the notion that cosmological inflation can explain the low-entropy
state of the early universe, see Carroll (2010), chapter 14. The question as to whether
initial conditions for the universe need explanation at all is addressed by Callender (2004).
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of the apparently irreversible behaviour in question.5 That we standardly
appeal to past conditions is surely a reflection of our habit of thinking that
causality defines a temporal arrow. But isn’t this folk physics? And if we
are appealing to the past, the further question arises as to how far back into
the past we should go. Does it matter if the age of the universe is finite or
not?6
Then there is the question as to what extent the existence of irreversibil-
ity in the world really is a problem given the time symmetrical nature of
micro-dynamics. We see symmetry-breaking all around us! If, for instance,
we rotate our bodies by less than 360 degrees, or move sideways in space,
we normally see a different arrangement of things in our line of sight, yet
we take space to be locally isotropic and homogenous. Similarly, the world
today is different from the world yesterday, yet we believe time to be homo-
geneous.7 Should the thermodynamic arrow of time be considered any more
problematic? Philosophers of physics agonise far more over it. Indeed, the
temporal asymmetry of goings-on in the universe is sometimes referred to
as a “paradox” in the light of the temporal symmetry of the fundamental
laws.
I do not see that any inconsistency is involved.8 It is widely accepted
that phenomena such as the expansion of the universe, or the absence of
white holes, are consistent with the time-symmetric field equations in general
relativity. Thermodynamic irreversibility in the behaviour of macroscopic
systems is arguably no different in classical statistical mechanics. It is,
5Carroll (op. cit., chapter 3) stresses this point, but goes on (in footnote 51) to endorse
Huw Price’s claim that a consistent cosmology based on time-symmetric laws should have
a time-symmetric history. (See Price (1996).) This claim strikes me as wrong-headed, for
reasons outlined in the following paragraphs.
6Carroll (op. cit., chapter 3) suggests entropic considerations might have ruled out
steady state cosmologies from the beginning, since an eternal cosmological entropic gra-
dient would be impossible to reconcile with such a cosmology. But in this context such
an entropic assumption is surely questionable; in his seminal 1948 steady state model,
Hoyle claimed that “thermodynamics has only localized applicaltion. There is no general
thermodynamic degeneration of the observable universe as a whole.” (Hoyle (1948), p.
381.) It is noteworthy that Einstein, keenly interested in the thermodynamic and electro-
dynamic arrows of time, was prepared to entertain a steady state cosmology until as late
as 1931. (See O’Raifeartaigh (2016).)
7Note however that one of the motivations of the steady state cosmology was the notion
that the cosmological principle should hold for time as well space; see Hoyle (1948).
8The consistency position is defended in Earman (1974). On the other hand, Michael
Mackey has argued that the thermodynamic arrow of time for closed systems strictly
requires non-invertible dynamics. See Mackey (2003), pp. xi and 102. For a more recent
defence of the view that deterministic time-symmetric dynamics cannot account for the
thermodynamic arrow of time, see Drossel (2014, 2015).
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again, a question of (something like) initial conditions. If anything makes
the thermodynamic case more dramatic, it is the ubiquitousness of the same
entropic behaviour in quasi-isolated subsystems of the universe.
The first philosopher to appreciate this was (I think) Hans Reichenbach,
who bequeathed to the world the terminology of branch systems in his 1956
book The Direction of Time.9 These are macroscopic subsystems of the
universe, which happen to peel themselves off, either naturally or through
human intervention, from the rest of the universe. They then remain in a
state of near-isolation either indefinitely or for some finite period of time.
Reichenbach stressed, as did Paul Davies after him, that all our experience
of thermodynamic irreversibility is gained by observation of such branch
systems. (In 1974 Davies himself used the example of a cube of ice in a glass
of lukewarm liquid, later to play a prominent role in David Albert’s 2000
book.10) The striking thing about the branch systems that we observe in
the universe is that they all display entropic behaviour in the same tempo-
ral sense. Doesn’t this synchronisation of mutually non-interacting branch
systems demand an explanation?11
A useful distinction in this context was made in 1994 by Davies when
he separated the question of the “nature” from that of the “origin” of the
arrow of time.12 The first concerns the behaviour of any branch system
following its initial formation in a low entropy, non-equilibrium state. The
second concerns what accounts for the low entropy states in the first place,
which inevitably introduces cosmological considerations. Davies, following
Reichenbach, argued that the nature of the arrow of time has a relatively
straightforward explanation13; his account of the origin is more tentative,
based on big-bang cosmology. Lawrence Sklar, in his 1993 book Physics and
Chance, criticised Reichenbach’s treatment, and wrote:
We could also just assume that the initial total [micro]state
of the universe fully determines all its subsequent states. Then
we would simply posit an initial state that gives rise to parallel
entropic increase in branch systems with each other and with the
main system. But to characterise the state in that way would, of
9Reichenbach (1991).
10Davies (1974), p. 69.
11As Zeh (2001), p. 54, has written, “The universality of the arrow of time seems to be
its most important property.” See also Penrose (2001), p. 79.
12Davies (1994).
13This is based on the notion that in a time-symmetric universe, states of low entropy
are almost certainly followed and preceded by states of higher entropy; see Davis (1974),
section 3.4.
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course, not be offering us an explanation of the sort we expected.
. . . to derive the Second Law from a bald assertion that “ini-
tial conditions were such that they would lead to Second Law
behaviour” hardly seems of much interest.14
Can we do better? Should we?
The final quotations in this warm-up section are due to Ludwig Boltz-
mann:
The Minimum Theorem [H-theorem], as well as the so-called Sec-
ond Law of Thermodynamics, are only theorems of probability.
The Second Law can never be proved by means of the equations
of dynamics alone.15
Since in the differential equations of mechanics themselves there
is absolutely nothing analogous to the second law of thermo-
dynamics, the latter can be mechanically represented only by
means of assumptions regarding initial conditions.16
So is it initial conditions or probability considerations that take front
stage in the attempt to understand thermodynamic behaviour from a me-
chanical viewpoint? According to the versions of the Past Hypothesis we
will now discuss, it is both, but the details differ in important ways.
3 Albert’s past hypothesis
In chapter 4 of Time and Chance, David Albert took a very dim view of Paul
Davies’ 1974 discussion of branch systems. Davies, following Reichenbach,
was of the opinion that the familiar synchronised entropic behaviour for
branch systems following an initial low entropy state in each (the “nature”
issue) could be accounted for probabilistically; we need not concern ourselves
for the moment with the precise argument. Davies wrote in 1974:
. . . it may be asserted confidently that almost all branch systems
will show parallel entropy change. It is the asymmetry regard-
ing the formation of the branch systems which brings about the
parallel increase in all (nearly) branch system entropies. This
asymmetry is definitely not supplied by statistics, coarse grain-
ing, the H -theorem or anything else. If the branch systems are
14Sklar (1993), p. 330.
15Boltzmann (1895), p. 414.
16Boltzmann (1904), pp. 170-171.
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regarded as not existing in the past, then the entropy of the
overwhelming majority of these systems will increase with time.
It is through branch systems that the customary intuitive notion
that entropy increases with time is derived.17
The key claim here is that if branch systems come into being in low entropy
states, then their entropy will, in all probability, not decrease over time, and
observers will, in all probability, fail to see anti-thermodynamic behaviour
anywhere in the universe. The separate question as to why the initial states
are low entropy is what Davies (later) called the “origin” issue, as we have
seen.
Albert considered Davies’ reasoning to be “sheer madness”. The basis
of his scorn consists in the observations that the beginnings of branch sys-
tems are not exact events in time, that the branch systems themselves are
part of larger systems within larger systems, and that a question of mutual
consistency arises in relation to the statistical hypotheses being introduced
in relation to all branch systems. Such qualms led Albert to believe that
Davies’ reasoning must therefore rest on an “epistemic” interpretation of
the probabilities in the argument.18 For those readers with doubts about
the objective nature of probabilities, particularly in a theory involving de-
terministic dynamics (see section 7 below), Albert’s ire may seem a little
perplexing. However, our concern right now is more with what Albert in-
herits from Davies than what he rejects. He accepts Davies’ temporal (if not
probabilistic) logic, but regards it as applicable only to the whole universe
“at the moment it came into being.”
Here then are the elements of what Albert calls the Newtonian statistical
mechanical contraption for making inferences. First, the microscopic goings-
on conform to the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Second,
The Past Hypothesis (which is that the world first came into
being into whatever particular low-entropy highly condensed big-
bang kind of macrocondition it is that the normal inferential
procedures of cosmology will eventually present to us).
Third,
The Statistical Hypothesis (which is that the right probability-
distribution to use for making inferences about the past and the
future is that one that’s uniform, on the standard measure, over
17Davies (1974), pp. ??
18See footnote 16 in chapter 4, in Albert (2000).
7
those regions of phase space which are compatible with what-
ever information – either in the form of laws or in the form of
contingent empirical facts – we happen to have).19
4 Comments on Albert’s contraption
Some of the comments I wish to make about Albert’s arguments for the New-
tonian contraption apply equally, or nearly so, to David Wallace’s version
of the past hypothesis, so I defer them until later (section 6).
(i) It was noted by Uffink that insofar as it depends on developments that
will “eventually” emerge in cosmology, Albert’s Past Hypothesis is rendered
impotent in relation to current inferences about the behaviour of statisti-
cal mechanical systems.20 Whether Albert needed to be so tentative is not
clear to me. At any rate, the hypothesis has also come under considerable
criticism for presupposing that the notion of thermodynamic entropy can be
applied to the universe as a whole (at least when gravity is taken into ac-
count), whatever the developments in cosmology might be.21 This question
has been discussed in a penetrating paper by David Wallace, which contains
a nuanced defence of Albert in this regard.22
(ii) At what point in the history of the universe are Albert’s “statistical”
(i.e. probabilistic) considerations to be applied? The question may seem
inapposite, given the assumption that the probability density is a solution
of the deterministic Liouville equation, but bear with me. At the end of
chapter 4 and in chapter 6, the statistical “posit” is applied to the present
state of affairs (hence the wording of the Statistical Hypothesis above):
Start with a probability-distribution which is uniform – on
the standard measure – over the world’s present macrocondi-
tion. Conditionalize that distribution on all we take ourselves
to know of the world’s entire macroscopic past history (and this
will amount to precisely the same thing – if you think it over –
as conditionalizing it on the past hypothesis). Then evolve this
conditionalized present-distribution, by means of the equations
of motion, into the future.
19Albert (2000), p. 96.
20Uffink (2002).
21See Earman (2006).
22Wallace (2009).
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This will yield (among other information) everything we take
ourselves to know of the future.23
Of course we know next to nothing of the world’s present macrostate (how-
ever we define it), simply because we have information only of events in our
past light cone, but given that Albert is dealing with a Newtonian universe,
perhaps this complication can be ignored. Uffink has also correctly pointed
out that conditionalising on all we know of the world’s past history is not
the same as conditionalising on the past hypothesis;24 I will return to this
question shortly. The point I want to emphasise now is that a significant
part of chapter 4 is taken up with the application of the statistical posit not
at the present time but at the first instant of the universe; indeed strong
arguments are adduced to the effect that such a statistical posit should be
introduced only at this instant, and these arguments have in part to do with
the time-symmetrical nature of the hypothesis (a feature to which I return
below):
. . . all such posits are bound to fail – unless they concern
nothing less than the entirety of the universe at nothing later
that its beginning.
That’s what the statistical posit is going to have to be about,
then. And if the project of statistical mechanics is on anything
like the right track, then, when all the data are in, the initial
macrocondition of the universe had better turn out to be one rel-
ative to which – on the standard uniform probability-distribution
over micro conditions – what we think we know of the history of
the world and its future, is typical.25
Likewise, in addressing the Davies/Reichenbach analysis of branch systems,
and worrying (to repeat) about the consistency of statistical hypotheses
applied to different individual branch systems, Albert writes:
And all that aside, why in God’s name bother with all this, when
the uniform probability-distribution over the possible microcon-
ditions compatible with the macrocondition of the world, at the
moment it came into being, will very straightforwardly give us
everything we need?26
23Albert (2000), p. 122.
24Uffink (2002)
25Op. cit, p. 85.
26Op. cit., p. 89. It is noteworthy that in his critique of Albert’s contraption, Earman
assumes that the moment of application of the Statistical Hypotheses is close to the initial
instant of the world, not the present; see Earman (2006), section 6.
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Yet Albert goes on in Chapter 4 to argue that it is not everything we
need. The probabilistic reasoning is switched to the present (hence the
wording in the Statistical Hypothesis), with the acknowledgment that this
makes a low entropy start to the world vastly improbable. However, a new
consideration justifies, according to Albert, conditionalising on the Past Hy-
pothesis of low entropy: the hypothesis is predictively fecund. Whether this
claim makes sense within Albert’s contraption will be discussed shortly.27
At any rate, it seems that for Albert this consideration allows us to simply
ignore his earlier argument that applying the statistical posit at any time
after the Big Bang makes a lower entropy past (relative to that time) hugely
unlikely.
At this stage I feel that I am losing my grip on Albert’s claim that
probabilities in statistical mechanics are objective, and evolving according
to the Liouville equation. This is not helped by reading that the reason we
believe in the Past Hypothesis is because of its
. . . conspicuous success . . . in making predictions about how fu-
ture particular observations are likely to come out, and (more
profoundly, perhaps) because it manages to render various of
the other most fundamental convictions (about the veracity of
our memories, and about the truth of the second law of thermo-
dynamics, and about the accuracy of the dynamical equations of
motion and about the reliability of the techniques of prediction
and retrodiction, and so on) compatible with one another.28
What the reference to “success” presupposes is that in using the Newto-
nian contraption in the past we have made probabilistic predictions about
the behaviour the universe that were compatible with what later actually
transpired. But if one applies the contraption now to predict future such be-
haviour, we are conditionalising on (in part) what we have learnt about the
world since the previous application. The relevant probability distribution
will not be exactly the (Liouville) time-evolved distribution used last time,
since certain arrangements of the world that are possible according to the
previous predictions have now been ruled out. It appears we face exactly the
kind of consistency problem that Albert sees in Davies’ 1974 treatment.29
The suggested (Bayesian) updating of the probabilities is non-problematic
if the probabilities represent credences, but that interpretation is precisely
what Albert rejects.
27See also the critical comments in Wallace (2010), section 1.
28Op. cit, p. 119.
29Earman (2006), p. 405.
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(iii) In chapter 4 of Time and Chance we read that
. . . the statistical postulate, if applied to the present, is flatly in-
consistent with what we take to be true, with what we remember,
with what is recorded . . . of the past.30
I take Albert to be plugging the argument, familiar within the neo-Boltzmannian
literature, that if our probabilistic predictions are that higher entropy states
obtain in the future, then the time-symmetrical nature of the contraption
entails that higher entropy states are also highly likely in the past, contrary
to experience (assuming our memories and records are veridical).31 Albert
brings this out nicely by using an iterative argument involving an ice-cube
in likewarm water. But at this point a nasty thought presents itself. If the
probabilistic reasoning is strictly time-symmetric, why doesn’t the wild con-
flict with empirical evidence about the past, resulting from applying it to the
present, or any time after the creation of the ice-water system, not represent
a refutation of the statistical posit tout court, of the kind that would hold if
the future behaviour of the system turned out to be anti-thermodynamic?32
Thinking of a spatial analogy might help to make the problem more ev-
ident. You can buy a modern domestic heater from the British firm Dyson,
which improbably looks like a scaled-up version of the head of a needle, ver-
tically mounted on a moveable stand. The eye of the needle blows out hot
air when the device is switched on. An initial cursory look at the device re-
veals nothing that distinguishes the front from the rear, and a not unnatural
hypothesis would be that the mechanism itself is symmetric and so blows
hot air in both directions. But on turning the device on, you find that hot
air is blown in only one direction! In relation to the symmetry hypothesis,
there seem to be two options. The first is that the hypothesis is flatly refuted
by the actual operation of the device. The second – the spatial analogue of
Albert’s reasoning – is that by putting the device flush up against a wall,
thus blocking one direction of putative heat flow, no incriminating evidence
is seen, and the hypothesis is saved.
So it seems to me that unless there is a principled reason for positioning
the statistical posit regarding the universe at the Big Bang or near it, the
30Albert (2000), p. 81.
31Since there is a very small chance, according to the argument, that the past actually
conforms to what the records indicate, the claim that the statistical hypothesis is “flatly
inconsistent” with such records is obviously an overstatement.
32Earman (op.cit.) raises the obvious question, following his demonstration that some-
thing like Albert’s statistical hypothesis can only hold at one time, as to why it should be
regarded as valid at that very time. Our criticism is somewhat different, but in the same
spirit as Earman’s.
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spectre of outright refutation of the contraption looms, if the probabilistic
reasoning is time-symmetric.
But is it? I am reminded of an observation that Gibbs made, one that
Albert in particular found unacceptable: that probabilistic inferences are of
their nature time-asymmetric in a certain sense. But to take this further
means opening the proverbial can of worms that is the meaning of proba-
bility. I do this in section 7 below. In the meantime note that nothing in
Albert’s contraption actually exploits the alleged time-symmetric nature of
probabilities. By this I mean that effectively no probabilistic retrodictions,
as opposed to predictions, are found in Time and Chance once the final
details of the Newtonian contraption are arrived at. When the Statistical
Hypothesis is applied to the present world macrocondition, it is condition-
alized on the known past history of the universe. No probabilistic retrodic-
tions here. When the statistical posit is applied to the birth of the universe,
retrodictions of any kind are obviously out of the question!
(iv) In Albert’s contraption, the probability of a microstate, randomly
chosen from the known macrostate of the system in question (whether the
ice cube in water, or the universe), leading to future macrostates of higher
entropy, is determined by appeal to the “standard” measure on the phase
space as well as a probability distribution on the space. The standard mea-
sure, which Albert also refers to as the “familiar” measure, is clearly the
Liouville/Lebesgue (LL) measure. The physical credentials of the LL mea-
sure presumably have to do with the fact that it is preserved under the
Hamiltonian flow (the basis of the Poincare´ recurrence theorem which Al-
bert discusses in chapter 433), and the fact that it provides the phase space
volumes which appear in the definition of the Boltzmann entropy. However,
there appears to be a degree of arbitrariness in the statistical hypothesis.
Call the non-equilibrium macrostate of the system at a given time M ,
and let N be the set of what Albert calls “abnormal” microstates within M
which lead in the future to lower Boltzmann entropy. Albert assumes that
the LL measure of the subset N is vastly smaller than that of its complement
in M , denoted here by M −N .34 Then assigning a probability distribution
33For a critical discussion of Albert’s proof of the theorem, as well as his account of
Boltzmann’s H-theorem, see Brown et al. 2009
34If M refers to the universe (or branch system) and the time t is later than the Big Bang
(or the creation of the branch system), then it makes no difference to the argument if M
is restricted to microstates consistent with the known macrostate at t but also consistent
with the initial low entropy macrostate just after the Big Bang (or creation). In his
recent review of the foundations of statistical mechanics, Frigg has pointed out there has
been relatively little discussion in the literature concerning the justification of the above
measure theoretic assumption; see Frigg (2013). However, it is unclear whether it is even
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that is uniform over M and zero elsewhere in the phase space means that
entropic behaviour of the system in the future will in all likelihood be what
is predicted in thermodynamics, and what we actually observe to be the
case. Note that in chapter 3, Albert takes it as
. . . some sort of fact – or at any rate it seems to make correct
predictions to suppose that it is some sort of fact – that the
percentage of any large collection of randomly selected systems
whose microconditions lie within any particular subregion of the
X-region of the phase space will be more or less proportional to
the familiarly defined [LL] volume of that subregion. And so the
sort of fact that [it] is must be an empirical one, a contingent
one, a scientific one.35
The notion of “random selection” here is of course purely theoretical. As E.
T. Jaynes pointed out:
It almost never makes sense . . . to think of the probability of a
microstate as a real frequency in any “random experiment”. In
thermodynamics the imaginary experiment would have to be re-
peated for perhaps exp(1024) times before there was much chance
of that particular microstate appearing even once.36
Suppose then, for the sake of argument, the LL measure on the phase space
assigns roughly equal weights toN andM−N as defined above. One can still
maintain that the probability of observing anti-thermodynamic behaviour is
very small as long as a suitable, non-uniform probability density is assigned
to M , whose (Lebesgue) integral over N leads to a number much smaller
than the corresponding integral over M − N . If the probability density is
supposed to be objective, how would we know whether this version of the
statistical hypothesis is wrong, when it gives us the same phenomenological
results as Albert’s?
Of course this rival suggestion is degenerate: there is a plethora of dis-
tinct combinations of measure assignments toN andM−N and non-uniform
probability distributions that do the trick; we cannot know which one to
choose. Albert’s contraption is not degenerate in the same sense: there
uniquely specifiable within a neo-Boltzmannian account of irreversible behaviour, given
the conceptual distinction between measures and probability distributions; see below.
35Op. cit. p. 65. Presumably this “fact” is related to Albert’s further assumption
in chapter 3 that within the low-entropy macrostate M , the subset N of “abnormal”
microstates is composed of pockets randomly scattered throughout M .
36Jaynes (1985).
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is only one uniform distribution, in which case the measure assignment is
largely fixed: the measure of N is vastly larger than that of M−N . (It is not
clear that this is really the simplest hypothesis; what about the possibility
involving the measures of N and M −N being exactly equal?) But surely
the obvious justification for choosing a uniform probability distribution in
the first place is that it reflects our knowledge that the initial microstate
lies within M , and our undifferentiated ignorance as to where it is within
M . This is hardly in tune with the notion that the distribution reflects
something objective about the system.37
(v) Albert is fully aware of the fact that for macrosystems, the equilib-
rium macrostate as defined by Boltzmann is overwhelmingly larger (accord-
ing to the LL measure) than any other macrostate. In Chapter 3 of Time
and Chance, Albert says that it is “precisely this imbalance ... that gets the
statistical-mechanical account of the second law of thermodynamics off the
ground.”38 It is noteworthy, then, that in Chapter 4, he appears to treat
the imbalance as having heuristic significance and no more; in particular
he distances himself from the well-known neo-Boltzmannian combinatorial
argument to the effect that given such huge imbalance, a system starting in
a non-equilibrium macrostate will, with high probability, find itself “reason-
ably quickly” in the equilibrium state — unless the dynamics is “ridiculously
special”.39 At any rate, the contraption Albert develops in Chapter 4, which
we have just been discussing, provides quite a different explanation of equili-
bration, or at least an entropic gradient. As far as I can see, nowhere in the
contraption is there an appeal, or the need for an appeal, to this huge asym-
metry in the LL-volume of the equilibrium macrostate in relation to any
other macrostates, at least as it applies the universe (which is not currently
in equilibrium). It is consistent with the contraption that the macrostates
that the universe has been displaying throughout its history have been suc-
cessively larger in the LL-measure — but not hugely so. There is no reason
why this cannot continue to equilibrium, although of course there are very
good independent arguments for the equilibrium macrostate being vastly
larger than any other. (We shall see later that Wallace’s contraption like-
wise makes little use of the neo-Boltzmannian combinatorial argument.)
(vi) Recall Sklar’s frustration (see the end of section 2 above) with the
37Earman (2006), section 3, also raises the question of the connection between the
Liouville measure and physical probabilities, and uses the ergodic hypothesis – which
Albert repudiates – to shed light on the matter.
38Op. cit., p. 45.
39See Goldstein (2001). Albert regards the argument as no more than “a crude stab”
at explaining irreversibility.
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view that the mechanical derivation of the second law of thermodynamics
(to the extent to which it is valid) boils down to the bald claim that the
initial (micro-)conditions lead to it. It is not clear to me exactly what would
count as a remedy for Sklar. But it would surely be nice if within cosmology
we could find some kind of explanation as to why the universe spawns off
branch systems in low entropy states – a key aspect of Davies’ “origin”
question.40 It would be nice too to have mechanical models of thermal
relaxation processes for branch systems that provide quantitative details of
diffusion coefficients, relaxation times, and so on – issues arguably related
to Davies’ “nature” question.
Albert’s contraption is not designed to meet either of these desiderata
(more on this below). Be that as it may, it is not clear to me whether those
nurturing such Sklarian frustration should be assuaged when contemplating
Albert’s contraption. If the statistical posit is applied at the birth of the uni-
verse, the initial conditions lead to the second law, but only probably. Is this
helpful? When the Statistical Hypothesis is applied at the present moment,
then the contraption apparently treats all we know about the entropic his-
tory of the world itself as a posit ; it does not explain it. And for those who
do not follow Sklar, and for whom the initial microcondition is unashamedly
the be-all and end-all of the story, the introduction of probabilities associ-
ated with such conditions might seem an unnecessary complication, except
at the present moment. But here the credences about the future are the
result either of inductive reasoning based on knowledge of the past, or of
a Boltzmann-type combinatorial argument, and not of solving Liouville’s
equation.
5 Wallace’s contraption
5.1 Motivations
In Time and Chance, when David Albert arrives at his Newtonian inferential
contraption at the end of chapter 4, it is the result of systematic trial-and-
40Davies points out that a full explanation would
need to consider the fact that the universe has evolved through a series of
self-organizing instabilities, leading to what Freeman Dyson has called ‘hang-
ups’, where subsystems get ‘hung up’ for long durations in quasi-stable,
quasi-isolated states. The reason for the existence of these hang-ups clearly
involves aspects of the laws of physics (e.g. the values of some constants) as
well as initial conditions. (Davies (1994), p. 129)
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error reasoning for the length of this and the previous chapter, without
introducing a single equation. In his 2011 paper The Logic of the Past
Hypothesis, David Wallace arrives at his version of the past hypothesis after
about nineteen pages of relatively heavy technical machinery. Indeed, when
you have worked through this machinery and find that the central notion is
called the “Simple Dynamical Conjecture”, you cannot but feel that this is
a testament to Wallace’s sense of humour.
There are three basic elements in Wallace’s treatment of irreversibility:
description, justification and the quantum.
The first has to do with his claim that prior versions of the Past Hypoth-
esis fail to take into account the fact that in modern chemistry, in particular,
the study of processes of equilibration involves not just qualitative but quan-
titative analysis. He writes:
It is, at best, very difficult to see how these quantitative theories
of the approach to equilibrium fit into the very general argument
for equilibration given by Albert, Goldstein et al.41
Wallace is of the view that successful quantitative descriptions of the process
of equilibration almost invariably involve appeal to a kind of coarse-graining
procedure applied to Gibbsian probability distributions over microstates of
the system in question.
The second element in Wallace’s treatment concerns the attempt to pro-
vide the “conceptual explanation”, or “justification”, of such a construction.
Hence the role played by his version of the past hypothesis, which is quite
different in detail from Albert’s.
The third feature that distinguishes Wallace’s analysis from Albert’s is
that Wallace is intent on developing a formal approach that applies to both
classical and quantum physics, where the latter is understood in the sense
of the Everett interpretation. It is important at this point to emphasise
Wallace’s thinking:
So my approach is in general to study the classical and quantum
cases in parallel, and to neglect the classical theory in favour of
the quantum one where they differ in important respects. If we
are interested in understanding irreversibility in our world, after
all, classical systems should be of interest to us only insofar as
they are good approximations to quantum systems.42
41Wallace (2011).
42Op. cit.
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As I mentioned in the Introduction, I will be concerned mostly with the
study of the classical case, but I include some remarks about the quantum
case at the end. Here is a brief summary of Wallace’s logic.
5.2 The Simple Past Hypothesis
This is stated as:
There is some Simple distribution function ρ over the phase space
of the Universe such that for any microstate x, ρ(x)δV is the
objective probability of the initial state of the Universe being in
some small region δV around x.43
Note that such a probabilities are “are not mere expressions of our ignorance,
but are in some sense objectively correct.” Much hangs of course on what
sense this is, and what the Simplicity criterion amounts to, and for the
moment I shall concentrate on the latter.
Consider a macrosystem (not necessarily the universe) whose state is
described by probability distribution ρ over its phase space, and a coarse-
graining map C which projects from the distribution space onto some subset
of the distributions. Being a projection, C satisfies the idempotency property
C2 = C, so that the the coarse-grained distribution C.ρ is unchanged by the
map. The coarse-graining map is such that the probability of any given
macroproperty of the system is approximately unchanged by its action on
ρ.
Now we come to the issue as to how to compare the standard Liouville
evolution of a distribution ρ with a coarse-grained version of the evolution.
Here the technicalities in Wallace’s account are considerable, so the follow-
ing informal synopsis must be treated with care by the reader. Wallace is
interested in the macrohistory α of the macrosystem defined over an in-
creasing sequence of times t1, ..., tN , which means the specification at each
time ti of a macro-property α(ti). Describing the macrohistory dynamically
means in the first instance taking the initial probability distribution ρ and
alternately evolving it forward by the Liouville microdynamics and then re-
stricting to the successive terms in α, i.e. projecting it onto the appropriate
macrostate.44 Now compare this with the coarse-grained dynamical picture,
where for each interval tk − tk−1, the Liouville evolution is replaced in the
above procedure by coarse-grained evolution relative to C. This involves
43Op. cit.
44See equation (2) in op. cit.
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taking the distribution ρ, evolving it forward using the deterministic Liou-
ville microdynamics for some time interval ∆t small compared to tk − tk−1,
coarse-graining it, evolving it for another small interval, coarse-graining,
and so on.45 (Wallace refers to this as the forward dynamics induced by C,
or the C+ dynamics.) Now if the results are the same in both procedures
for a given history space,46 Wallace says that ρ is forward predictable by C
on that history space. This signifies a significant constraint on the initial
distribution, relative to C; it effectively introduces irreversibility into the
macrodynamics of the system in question.
Now come the hypotheses. Wallace introduces the Simple Dynamical
Conjecture for a system of the kind we are interested in with coarse-graining
C: any distribution whose structure is at all simple is forward predictable
by C. If a Simple distribution is defined as one specifiable in a closed form
in a simple way, then Wallace says that the Simple Dynamical Conjecture
is just the conjecture that all Simple distributions are forward predictable
by C. Combining this conjecture with the Simple Past Hypothesis above for
the universe, we finally arrive at Wallace’s account of macro-irreversibility:
. . . the initial state of the world is forward predictable by the C+
dynamics: the macrodynamics defined by the C+ dynamics is the
same as the macrodynamics induced by the microdynamics.47
6 Comments on Wallace’s contraption
(i) The Simple Dynamical Conjecture is defined relative to a given macrohis-
tory of the system. If the system of interest is isolated and finite, and subject
to the recurrence theorem – which in the case of the universe is implausible
– then the conjecture can be true only for a history short in relation to the
recurrence time (subject to the usual exclusion of non-recurring initial states
which form a set of LL measure zero in the classical case48). This somewhat
vague constraint is forced by pain of contradiction and not, as far as I can
see, by the intrinsic nature of the Simple distribution. It is obvious, fur-
thermore, that Simplicity (given the Simple Dynamical Conjecture) cannot
be a necessary condition for equilibration. At any future time before the
end of the specified macrohistory, the probability distribution will no longer
45See equation (15) in op. cit.
46See equation (21) in op. cit.
47Op. cit.
48This caveat is unnecessary in the quantum recurrence theorem. For an insightful
comparison of the classical and quantum recurrence theorems, see Wallace (2015b).
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be Simple (see comment (iv) below). And in the case of a finite system,
even when, after an unimaginably long time, the initial non-equilibrium mi-
crostate of the system (or one arbitrarily close to it) recurs, the probability
distribution will still not be Simple, even though eventually the system will
re-equilibrate.
(ii) Recall that when Albert applies the statistical posit, either at the
birth of the universe or at the current time, the future of the system with
respect to that instant has non-decreasing entropic behaviour only with high
probability, according to his contraption. But given Wallace’s Simple Past
Hypothesis at the birth of the universe, and his Simple Dynamical Con-
jecture, it might seem that monotonic movement towards equilibrium is
guaranteed :
. . . any stipulation of the boundary conditions of the Universe
according to which the initial distribution of the Universe is rea-
sonably simple will (together with our microphysics) entail the
correctness of our [thermodynamical] macrophysics.49
There is no question that given Wallace’s assumptions, the coarse-grained
Gibbsian entropy of the universe must have been non-decreasing since its
inception, assuming that the relevant macrohistory defined in the Simple
Dynamical Conjecture is sufficiently extended to include the entire history
of the universe. Presumably it extends further; it would seem arbitrary to
limit it to the present moment. But this means that we can expect that
such entropy will be non-decreasing in the future (or if the universe or some
branch system is subject to recurrence, then at least for future times small
in relation to the recurrence time). Is this a different kind of forecast from
that generated by Albert’s contraption (or defended by neo-Boltmannians
more generally) in which anti-thermodynamic future behaviour is possible
but assigned very small probability? It is important to note that Wallace
distinguishes his reasoning from that of some neo-Boltzmannians (see section
4(v) above) in the following way:
. . . it is not that systems are guaranteed to achieve equilibrium
unless they or their dynamics are “ridiculously special”; it is
that only in “ridiculously special” cases will the micro-evolution
of a distribution not commute with coarse-graining. Whether,
and how fast, a system approaches thermal equilibrium is then
something that can be determined via these coarse-grained dy-
namics.
49Op. cit., section 9.
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In particular, it seems reasonable to make the Simple Dynami-
cal Conjecture that reasonably simple distributions do not show
anomalous behaviour.
Arguably, this last sentence does not do justice to Wallace’s reasoning. The
ridiculously special cases that he has in mind are not associated with non-
simple initial conditions, but rather with possible exceptions to the kind of
irreversible behaviour we expect of thermodynamic systems even when the
initial non-equilibrium conditions are simple. Like Albert, Wallace accepts
that “anomalous behaviour” is possible but very unlikely. But the basic
reason for this quite different from Albert’s: it is that the Gibbsian entropy
is defined in terms of the probability distribution ρ, and not the microstate
of the system as in the Boltzmann entropy.50
I confess I do not find this logic entirely transparent, partly because the
role of ρ in determining the probability of anomalous behaviour is unclear to
me, and also because lurking in the background there is the broader question
of what this probability distribution even means in the context of classical,
deterministic dynamics; this question will be taken up shortly.
(iii) In Wallace’s 2011 paper The Logic of the Past Hypothesis, there is
no reference to the LL measure in defining the Simplicity criterion, and it is
clear that a Simple distribution is not unique for a given macrohistory. But
in his 2013 paper Probability in Physics . . . , Wallace expands on what he
means by Simple distributions:
. . . there are very good (albeit somewhat non-rigorous) grounds
to believe that for a certain very wide class of probability distri-
butions (which could be characterised as being all those which
do not vary too chaotically and sharply with respect to a certain
baseline distribution, the Liouville measure) that the macrody-
namics generated by each of these distributions coincide (or very
nearly so) and determine a unique probability distribution over
future histories for any given macrostate at any time later than
the time t0 at which the probability distribution is defined.
51
I take it the baseline distribution here is that which is uniform relative to
the Liouville measure, the relevant set in the phase space presumably being
the initial (Boltzmannian) macrostate of the universe. In that case, the
doubts raised in comment (iii) in section 4 above in relation to the role of
the Liouville measure in Albert’s contraption apply equally well here.
50David Wallace, private communication.
51Wallace (2013), p. 6.
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(iv) Unlike Albert, Wallace recognises that his statistical posit (the Sim-
plicity condition) is not time-translation invariant; he shows explicitly that
generally the forward time evolution of a Simple distribution is not Sim-
ple. There is a unique, once-and-for-all time at which the condition can be
applied in the history of the universe, and thus Wallace appears to avoid
the consistency problem that I raised in relation to Albert’s contraption in
point (ii) of section 4 above. But he argues that at any time other than
(very near) the first instant
. . . the backwards dynamics induced by basically any coarse-
graining process is not empirically successful at all: in general it
wildly contradicts our actual records of the past.52
This is the critical reason that the Simplicity condition must be applied at
or very near the first instant of the universe. In Wallace’s words again:
We impose this probabilistic boundary condition at the begin-
ning of time (or at least, at the beginning of whatever period
of time we can empirically access) because this is the only way
to rule out the time-reversed macrodynamics that would other-
wise occur to the past of whatever time we choose to impose the
boundary condition.53
This reasoning is analogous to that found in chapter 4 of Albert’s Time
and Chance (see point (ii) in section 4 above) in justifying the placement
of the statistical posit at the birth of the universe, but it is seems more
persuasive. Wallace points out that a distribution will be Simple if and
only if its time reverse is. If the Simple Dynamical Conjecture is true for
the future, it is hard to see how it cannot be also for the past, given the
time-symmetric nature of the fundamental laws of classical mechanics. So
within the specified macrohistory of the system, the Simple distribution
must correspond to a non-recurring entropic minimum, and all the evidence
is that this must be at the beginning of the macrohistory of the system.
I think a word of caution is in order here. I questioned in point (iii) of
section 4 above whether the analogous reasoning in Albert’s contraption is
convincing if there is reason to believe that nature of probabilistic reasoning
is not time-symmetric. (I shall offer such a reason below.) Since, as we
have seen, Wallace believes that the macrodynamics following the Simple
52Wallace (2011), p. 15.
53Wallace (2013).
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distribution is (Boltzmann) entropy non-decreasing only with high proba-
bility, it is seems to me that a similar question may be asked of the Wallace
contraption.
(v) Wallace remarks that he has no need to postulate a low entropy to
the initial state of the universe relative to its present state, since the coarse-
grained Gibbs entropy is non-decreasing from the initial instant according
to the forward dynamics. He claims that Albert overlooked the fact that
the low entropy Past Hypothesis is likewise redundant in the contraption
defended in Time and Chance, but this fact relies, as I see it, on spurning
the option raised by Albert of applying the statistical posit at the present
time.
(vi) To repeat, Wallace envisages the use of coarse-graining as almost an
inevitability in any satisfactory account of macroscopic dynamics:
. . . the forward dynamics induced by coarse-graining classical or
quantum mechanics has been massively empirically successful.
Pretty much all of our quantitative theories of macroscopic dy-
namics rely on it, and those theories are in general very well
confirmed by experiment. With a great deal of generality – and
never mind the conceptual explanation as to why it works – if
we want to work out quantitatively what a large physical sys-
tem is going to do in the future, we do so by constructing a
coarse-graining-induced forward dynamics.54
Is this always so? Let’s see.
6.1 The Boltzmann equation
The dilute gas (in which collisions between molecules are binary) provides, in
Wallace’s words, “perhaps the best-known example of an evolution equation
for non-equilibrium statistical mechanics”55:
df
dt
= N
∫
dv′du′|v − v′|σ(uu′ → vv′) (f(u)f(u′)− f(v)f(v′)) (1)
This is of course the Boltzmann transport equation, where the “probability”
density f(r,v, t) is assumed to be spatially uniform and isotropic and so can
be expressed as f(v, t). N is the particle number density, σ is the scattering
cross section. Derivation of the equation requires that the collisions be
54Op. cit.
55Wallace (2015), section 5.
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subject at each instant to the Stosszahlansatz condition (henceforth SZA)
which states that pairs of molecules about to collide are uncorrelated in
velocity. Boltzmann’s corollary, his famous H-theorem, established that a
dilute, spatially homogenous gas spontaneously and monotonically tends to
the Maxwell-Boltzmann velocity distribution.
Wallace takes this to be one of several examples of the quantitative treat-
ments of irreversibility that he is trying to encapsulate in his forward dy-
namics. Even E. T. Jaynes, who was not a fan of Boltzmann’s H-theorem,
had to admit that his “collision” equation
. . . gives definite theoretical predictions for transport coefficients
(viscosity, diffusion, heat conductivity) . . . the fact remains that
it has been very successful in giving good numerical values for
these transport coefficients; and it does so even for fairly dense
gases, where we really have no right to expect such success.56
However, I would argue that the Boltzmann transport equation, at least
as originally conceived, provides a counterexample to the coarse-graining
paradigm, insofar as this paradigm involves a Gibbsian probability distribu-
tion.
The key question is whether the “probability” distribution involved in
the Boltzmann equation and the H-theorem is anything like the probabil-
ity distribution involved in Wallace’s treatment, which is defined over the
phase space of the system of interest. As Wallace himself notes, Boltzmann
understood f(v, t) to mean the fractional number density of particles with
a velocity v at time t, as opposed to the common interpretation in mod-
ern textbooks as the marginal one-particle probability distribution averaged
over particle position (see below).57 Under Boltzmann’s reading, f is a prop-
erty of a given microstate, not a probability distribution over microstates.58.
Since the number of molecules in a gas is finite, f is strictly a sum of delta
functions, and not a continuous function that is differentiable with respect
to v and t. Although some theorists have concluded that f must therefore
56Jaynes (1967), p. 91. Further remarks supporting the importance of the Boltzmann
equation in understanding the equilibration process in dilute gases and beyond are found
in Wallace (2015a).
57In his 1872 H-theorem, Boltzmann initially awkwardly defined f as a density function
on kinetic energy space (see Klein 1963). On a separate note, Jaynes (1965) argued per-
suasively that the negative of the H-function and the fine-grained Gibbs entropy, though
similar in appearance, are different when intermolecular interactions are taken into ac-
count. There is also the obvious point that this Gibbs entropy is strictly a constant of the
motion, where H is not.
58See, e.g., Klein (1973), Jaynes (1967) and Goldstein (2001).
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be the probable, or alternatively, average number of molecules within the
mentioned volume elements, this was not (to repeat) Boltzmann’s original
view, nor indeed Maxwell’s.59 Presumably the idealised treatment of the
function is justified by the vast number of molecules involved.60 But this
makes the SZA in turn a condition on the instantaneous microstate of the
gas; no ensembles of gases are involved then in interpreting the Boltzmann
transport equation or the H-theorem in its original guise.61
Wallace nonetheless views the application of the SZA in the Boltzmann
equation and the H-theorem as an instance of coarse-graining:
This assumption [SZA] is in general very unlikely to be true . . . ,
but we can reinterpret Boltzmann’s derivation as the forward
dynamics induced by the coarse-graining process of simply dis-
carding those correlations. . . .
. . . Pretty much all of non-equilibrium kinetic theory operates,
much as in the case of the H theorem, by discarding the correla-
tions between different particles’ velocities.63
I confess I am puzzled. The validity of the Boltzmann equation requires that
the relevant correlations actually vanish at each moment the SZA is valid.
As to whether such a condition is improbable64, the widespread applicability
of the Boltzmann equation – even in the case of galactic dynamics, as Wallace
himself stresses,65 should raise doubts.
Boltzmann’sH-theorem has received rather bad press, in both the physics
and philosophical literature, in the light of Loschmidt’s reversibility objec-
tion and Zermelo’s recurrence objection.66 But I have come to think that
neither objection is very telling, and that in trying to address Loschmidt’s
critique Boltzmann muddied the waters horribly by introducing a proba-
bilistic element into the workings of the H-theorem – an element which,
59See Myrvold (2011).
60See Spohn (2001), p. 57.
61A simple physical (“wind-tree”) model, devised originally by the Ehrenfests62 with a
view to exposing the basic elements of the H-theorem, clearly demonstrates that Gibbsian
probabilities are not intrinsic to the reasoning; see Brown et al. (2009).
63Wallace (2011), section 3. Note that Wallace refers to correlations amongst particle
velocities, but the SZA refers to a proper subset of particles, namely those about to collide
at the instant the SZA is assumed to hold.
64Here Wallace ibid. cites an argument to this effect from Sklar (1993), pp. 224-7.
65Wallace (2015a).
66See for example Brown et al. (2009), Gogolin and Eisert (2016), section A.1.1.
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as Jaynes scathingly noted, has no clear role in the analysis.67 (It was of
course Boltzmann’s later combinatorial/probabilistic approach to the analy-
sis of irreversible behaviour, which essentially sidestepped the collision-based
considerations leading to the transport equation and the H-theorem, that
influenced Albert’s thinking on the past hypothesis. But it is worth noting
that Boltzmann never abandoned the H-theorem.) Neither objection rules
out the possibility of an initial non-equilibrium microstate of the system
leading to extended periods of time (but short obviously compared to re-
currence times) within which the (time-asymmetric) SZA is approximately
valid at every instant, so the gas displays a spontaneous approach to the
equilibrium Maxwell-Boltzmann velocity distribution.68 Boltzmann is pro-
viding a mechanical model of “irreversible” behaviour over a certain period
of time. As Wehrl nicely put it in 1978,
. . . although the time evolution of the total system is given by
the Hamiltonian dynamics, under certain conditions the time
evolution of the first correlation [single particle density] function
can be described, in fairly good approximation, by an irreversible
equation.69
Let us not quibble as to whether Boltzmann’s H-theorem is an explanation
of spontaneous thermalization; after all, something time asymmetric has to
be put in somewhere. There is of course the further question, which is why
we are surrounded by branch systems which start their lives in such special
initial states – what Davies calls the “origin” problem, as we have seen.
This was simply not Boltzmann’s concern when he derived his celebrated
transport equation, though it is intimately connected with Loschmidt’s ob-
jection.70
67Jaynes (1967). For a discussion of Boltzmann’s probabilistic turn, see Brown et al.
(2009).
68Davies in his 1974 book (section 3.1) argues that the SZA can only hold at isolated
peaks in the H-curve, and repeats this claim in his 1994 paper. The error in Davies’
reasoning is pointed out in Brown et al. (2009). Another mistaken claim is that the
SZA outside equilibrium is inconsistent with the time-symmetric nature of the dynamics
of collisions (based in turn on the misleading claim that collisions produce correlations).
This mistake is found in the otherwise excellent books by Lockwood (2005), pp. 206-8,
and Blundell and Blundell (2006), section 34.5.
69Wehrl (1978), p. 227.
70Two decades later, in responding to a criticism by Zermelo, Boltzmann wrote: “An
answer to the question – how does it happen that at present the bodies surrounding us
are in a very improbable state – cannot be given, any more than one can expect science to
tell us why phenomena occur at all and take place according to certain laws.” See Brown
et al. (2009), p. 179.
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But the key point I want to stress is that it is not strictly necessary to
regard the density function involved in its workings as anything other than
a property of the instantaneous microstate of the system – despite the fact
that many modern treatments treat the equation as the one-particle first
equation in the BBGKY hierarchy, which is built on the distinct (Gibbsian)
notion of a fundamental probability distribution over microstates.71
Now it must be recognised that the original 1872 H-theorem is incom-
plete in an important sense. As long as the SZA is valid, once the equilibrium
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution is achieved, it is permanent. There is no
possibility of fluctuations from the equilibrium distribution, and thus we
are apparently faced with an “outrage against Gibbsian common sense”.72
Indeed, it is sometimes claimed that the original Boltzmann transport equa-
tion is inconsistent with the fluctuation-dissipation theorem (FDT), which
since the 1960s has led to significant insights into non-equilibrium statistical
mechanics.73 This question deserves far more discussion than space allows
in this essay, but a few remarks are in order.
One remedy to the (lack of) fluctuations problem in the context of the
BBGKY hierarchy is to add to the linearised Boltzmann equation a stochas-
tic noise term.74 This addition is rather ad hoc, in the sense that it restores
consistency with the FDT; no attempt is made to introduce it in a prin-
cipled fashion. It is unclear to me whether such a term is involved in the
usual applications of the Boltzmann equation to gases and galaxies. At any
rate, it seems to me perfectly legitimate to accept that Boltzmann’s original
reasoning was incomplete, and to assert that it nonetheless provided a useful
mechanical model for thermalization which does not involve probabilities —
at least if one is prepared to put aside the above-mentioned “origin” problem
concerning initial conditions for branch systems. And all this within time-
reversal invariant fundamental dynamics: information is not being “thrown
away”, nor is there any coarse-graining in the argument. As we will see
below, a close analogue of the Boltzmann equation in quantum field theory
(QFT) likewise makes no appeal to Gibbsian ensembles, but, notably, does
incorporate fluctuations around equilibrium.
71See for example the treatment in Harris (2004), and in Wallace (2016). In his 1978
review paper on entropy, Werhrl asserts that the density function for a single gas is
“obtained from the ‘true’ distribution in phase space by some sort of averaging”. See
Wehrl (1978), pp. 227-8.
72Calzetta and Hu (2008), p. 58.
73See Kubo (1966).
74Calzetta and Hu (2008), p. 59.
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7 Probability
As we have seen, for both Albert and Wallace the probabilities involved in
their contraptions are objective. Here is Wallace:
. . . the probability distribution in statistical mechanics grounds
objective features of the world. The emergent almost-autonomous
stochastic macrodynamics have a definite directedness in time
and that directedness is a direct consequence of the imposition
of a Simple probability distribution at the start of the universe
rather than its end. . . . phenomena like the melting of ice or the
diffusion of gas have a clear time direction which can be tracked
back (at least in part) to the probabilistic boundary conditions.
If those boundary conditions are simply a matter of credences,
it is difficult to see what objective facts about the world are sup-
posed to ground its objective dynamical asymmetries in time.75
Often, the notion of probability is regarded as objective if it is defined
in terms of empirical (relative) frequencies, but the frequentist account of
probability is beset with problems that are well known and need no re-
hearsing here. It seems to me that neither Albert nor Wallace provide a
plausible account as to what probabilities mean operationally in their clas-
sical contraptions, and how it is that they come to be objective. In the
absence of such an account, it is unclear to me to what extent Albert and
Wallace are successful in explaining, as they both claim to, the thermody-
namic history of the universe. Nor is it obvious that the “objective facts
about the world” that are supposed to ground the objective asymmetry in
its behaviour over time need involve probabilities at all. They will certainly
be related to initial/boundary conditions, but a deterministic universe cares
about microstate conditions, not probability distributions over microstates.
(Whether these concerns arise in Wallace’s account of irreversibility in quan-
tum mechanics is a question taken up later.)
The analysis of probability in classical statistical mechanics that makes
most sense to me is the subjective Bayesian approach defended by E. T.
Jaynes and more recently by Jean Bricmont. Assigning a probability to
an event is, in this approach, determining a rational (unbiased) estimate of
likelihood of that event on the basis of prior information. Depending on the
context, this information may involve the current macostate of the system,
the past macro-history of the system, or both. For Jaynes, probabilistic
75Wallace (2013).
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reasoning is a central part of ampliative or inductive reasoning that goes
on all the time in life: “common sense reduced to calculation” (Laplace).
He regarded his work in statistical mechanics as a natural development of
the views of J. W. Gibbs, while eschewing the Gibbsian appeal to ensem-
bles and any ergodic-type justifications probability distributions. Writing
in 1985, Jaynes stressed that although “. . . the very idea that a probability
distribution describes our state of information is foreign to almost all recent
expositions of statistical mechanics”76, the idea is essential if we want to
modify our probability distribution when we have additional information in
the sense of Bayesian updating. An aspect of Wallace’s thinking I find hard
to understand is the joint claim that the “objective” probability distribution
ρ is a solution of the deterministic Liouville equation, and that
. . . if we want to retrodict we do so via the usual methods of sci-
entific inference: we make tentative guesses about the past, and
test those guesses by evolving them forward via the forward dy-
namics and comparing them with observation. (The best-known
and best-developed account of this practice is the Bayesian one:
we place a credence function on possible past states, deduce how
likely a given present state is conditional on each given past state,
and then use this information to update the past-state credence
function via Bayes Theorem.)77
For as Jaynes noted,
If one believes that a probability distribution describes a real
physical situation, then it would seem wrong to modify it merely
because we have additional information.78
76Jaynes (1985).
77Wallace (2010).
78Jaynes (1985). In similar vein, Bricmont wrote: “. . . there is no good reason why
one should let probabilities change in time according to the evolution induced by the
physical laws (like the the Liouville equation in classical physics). They certainly do
not obey such laws when one does Bayesian updating.” See Bricmont (2001), p. 19.
Bricmont correctly stresses the point that probabilistic reasoning is no more falsifiable
than deductive reasoning. Given a body of evidence, a probabilistic estimate is either
rational or otherwise; of course the later addition of fresh evidence will generally lead to
updating.
. . . probabilistic statements, understood subjectively, are forms of reasoning
. . . one cannot check them empirically. . . . the main point of Bayesianism is to
give rules that allow to update one’s probabilistic estimates, given previous
observations. p. 5.
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This is not the place for an extended analysis of probability, and in par-
ticular of subjective Bayesianism79, but I would like to draw attention to
one aspect of the latter that I feel that Jaynes and Bricmont could, per-
haps, have stressed more. It is that like all information-theoretic notions,
subjective Bayesianism in practice relies on an arrow of time, on the differ-
ence between the past and the future, and on the crucial role of memory and
records. In short, its application is, in an important sense, time-asymmetric.
Recall Richard Feynman’s 1965 definition of probability in physics as our es-
timate of likely frequencies in (Bernoulli trial) observations.80 Feynman was
explicit about the future nature of such observations, but surely in certain
circumstances we might find ourselves estimating the likelihood of unknown
past frequencies. The key point rather is that the estimation game is in-
variably based, partially if not entirely, on some knowledge of the present
or past, and that any likelihoods have to be consistent with that knowl-
edge. Gibbs may have been one of the first to note this time-asymmetry in
probabilistic reasoning in physics:
But while the distinction of prior and subsequent events may
be immaterial with respect to mathematical fiction, it is quite
otherwise with respect to events in the real world. It should not
be forgotten, when our ensembles are chosen to illustrate the
probabilities of events in the real world, that while probabilities
of subsequent events may be often determined from probabil-
ities of prior events, it is rarely the case that probabilities or
prior events can be determined from those of subsequent events,
for we are rarely justified in excluding from consideration the
antecedent probability of the prior events.81
P. and T. Ehrenfest, and more recently Albert, have found this reasoning
incomprehensible, but Lawrence Sklar, to his credit, did not. He thought it
resonated with
. . . those doctrines that take the probabilities of the statistical
theory to be subjective, the line being that knowing an event to
have occurred gives it a subjective probability of one and pre-
cludes our assigning it some inferential probability on theoretical
79To my knowledge, the best concise defence of this view with a view to the physics
readership is found in Bricmont (2001).
80Feynman et al. (1965), section 6-1; for further discussion see Brown (2011), section 3.
81Gibbs, reproduced in Sklar (1993), p. 58.
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grounds.82
This reasoning is indeed the basis of the doubt raised in section 4(iii) above
concerning the widespread claim that Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument
for spontaneous equilibration, or Albert’s variant of it, applies to the past
as much as to the future. For the argument necessarily involves proba-
bilities, and probabilities must surely reflect what Myrvold aptly calls the
“asymmetry of epistemic access” to the past and future.83
But Sklar himself was unconvinced, claiming that inferences to past
events are just as common as those to the future events. He considered
a system, like a gas in a box, out of equilibrium, whose past history is en-
tirely unknown, and argued that probabilistic inference would in this case
suggest a past state “closer to equilibrium rather than farther away from
it as we generally would, correctly, infer”. Of course the subjectivist would
claim that there is plenty of evidence based on observation of other similar
systems that would block this false inference. How else do we know what
the correct inference is? Sklar anticipates this response and argues:
But that claim, of course, is the posit of irreversibility in statis-
tical mechanics whose justification and explanation was what we
wanted in the first place.
But is the claim any different from Albert’s conditionalizing on “all we take
ourselves to know of the world’s entire macroscopic past history” when he
applies his statistical posit to the present time (see section 4(i) above)?
Sklar goes on to write:
... it is hard to see how the entropic asymmetry itself can be
thought to depend on any relativization of thermodynamic no-
tions or their statistical surrogates to our objective states of
knowledge combined with some given asymmetry of our knowl-
edge of the world. . . . it is hard to fill in any subjectivist theory
in such a way as to convince us that parallelism and asymmetry
of entropy increase is only an asymmetry of our inferential appli-
cations of probability founded on asymmetry in our knowledge
of past or future events.84
82Sklar (1993), p. 259. I take Bricmont’s 2001 treatment (op. cit.) to be consistent
with this position; see particularly his remarks on p. 8.
83See the thoughtful essay by Myrvold (2014), section 9. Note though that here Myrvold
is considering the asymmetric nature of Gibbsean equilibrium probability distributions;
it is not clear to me whether he intends the asymmetry to apply to the combinatorial
argument for a system out of equilibrium.
84Op. cit., p. 260.
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And in the same vein, Albert excoriates any subjective interpretation of
probabilities in statistical mechanics on similar grounds:
Can anyone seriously think that our merely being ignorant of the
exact micro conditions of thermodynamic systems plays some
part in bringing it about, in making it the case, that (say) milk
dissolves in coffee? 85
Reading these remarks makes me understand the exasperation Jaynes showed
at times in replying to his critics. Who indeed in their right minds would
think, or have thought, that the entropic arrow of time is ultimately explained
by appeal to human ignorance? It is worth noting, first, that Jaynes’ focus,
following that of Gibbs, is primarily to do with systems in equilibrium86,
and it is only successful because the large number of degrees of freedom
associated with thermodynamic systems make the probability distributions
for the relevant macroscopic properties enormously sharp.
Evidently, such sharp distributions for macroscopic quantities
can emerge only if it is true that for each of the overwhelming
majority of those states to which appreciable weight is assigned,
we would have the same macroscopic behaviour. We regard this,
not merely as an interesting side remark, but as the essential
fact without which matter would have no definite macroscopic
properties, and experimental physics would be impossible. It
is this principle of “macroscopic uniformity” which provides the
objective content of the calculations, not the probabilities per
se.87
Did Jaynes, or Gibbs for that matter, provide an explanation of irre-
versibility, of the non-decrease of entropy when the system is prodded into
going adiabatically from one equilibrium state to another? Jaynes provided
several explanations of the second law of thermodynamics, one close to the
familiar combinatorial argument favoured by the neo-Boltzmannians,88 and
one, in a famous 1965 paper comparing Boltzmann entropy (actually, the
negative of the H-function) and Gibbs’ entropy,89 that has left many readers,
85Albert (2000), ??. For similar remarks, see Wallace (2015a).
86van Lith correctly wondered what the significance is of the fine-grained Gibbs en-
tropy for non-stationary distributions, or for stationary distributions other than Gibbsian
ensembles; see van Lith (2001), p. 145.
87Jaynes (1957).
88Op.cit..
89Jaynes (1965).
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myself included, bemused. Whatever he was doing, Jaynes was not provid-
ing an explanation in the sense that Sklar is demanding. Indeed it was
Sklar himself who noted that the heavy lifting in Jaynes’ all-too-slick 1965
derivation of the second law of thermodynamics was done by his condition
of “reproducibility”, which effectively presupposes irreversible behaviour.90
Note that it does so without any appeal to probabilistic considerations,
subjective or otherwise. (Jaynes also seems to take it for granted that a
spontaneous process resulting from removing a constraint from a system in
equilibrium will lead to another equilibrium state, a process which is likewise
irreversible.91) I think a generous reading of Jaynes’ argument, or rather
arguments, is that they attempt not to derive the second law, but to show
that the law is consistent with the fact that the fine-grained Gibbs entropy
is a constant of the motion. At any rate, it strikes me as grossly unfair
to reject Jaynes’ analysis of probabilistic inference in statistical mechanics
on the grounds that it fails to provide something it never promises to pro-
vide in the absence of further dynamical considerations – an explanation of
irreversibility.92
This brings us back to the contentious matter as to how an explanation
can be provided by conferring the title “objective” to probability distribu-
tions, in the context of classical deterministic dynamics. Wallace is, unsur-
prisingly, sensitive to this issue. In his 2010 paper, he remains “neutral for
now as to how these probabilities should be understood.”93 Early in his
2013 paper Probability in Physics . . . he referred to the interpretation of
the probability distributions in statistical mechanics as a “vexed question”,
and later in the paper wondered if they can somehow be interpreted in
terms of objective chances, comparable perhaps to those involved in strictly
stochastic dynamics. His discussion at this point is inconclusive.94 At the
end of the paper, he concluded that in both cases of classical deterministic
and stochastic dynamics, “there are significant conceptual and philosophical
problems in making sense of the notion of probability that is being used.”95
90Sklar (1993), p. 258.
91See Brown and Uffink (2001).
92Note that Jaynes, although fully aware that it is not inevitable, at no point in the 1965
paper argues that the non-decrease of entropy is probable in adiabatic processes. Bricmont
op. cit. does provide a probabilistic account of irreversibility, in keeping with his view
that the probabilites are subjective, but the real work is being done by the dynamical
details associated with certain idealised systems.
93Wallace (2010), section 6, p. 20.
94Wallace (2013).
95Op. cit. p. 23.
32
8 Quantum theory
An important part of Wallace’s recent program involves the claim that not
only is probability conceptually less problematic in quantum mechanics than
in classical statistical mechanics, the quantum is the ultimate source of prob-
abilities in the classical limit. In his quantum mechanical account of irre-
versibility, the analogue of the Simplicity requirement for initial conditions
makes no appeal to probability distributions over states at all!
Wallace sees the entropic arrow of time emerging out of environment-
induced decoherence in quantum mechanics as analogous to the forward
macroscopic dynamics in classical mechanics; now the initial state of the
system is a “Simple” quantum state. He leaves open the question as to
whether this state is pure or represented by a non-idempotent statistical
(density) operator; the critical point is that, unlike in his classical analysis,
the Simple character of the state “is a constraint not on any probability
distribution over initial states but on the actual initial state”.96 This leads
Wallace to conclude that
. . . we should think of the classical limit of quantum mechanics
as already being classical statistical mechanics (a point that has
been stressed by Ballentine . . . ).
The idea then is that the mystery of the probability distribution in Wallace’s
classical contraption is solved by treating it as the classical limit of the
appropriate quantum mechanical account of irreversibility, using an appeal
to the objective probabilistic nature of the Simple states themselves in that
account. I have my doubts.
8.1 The quantum Boltzmann equation
There is a significant recent literature dealing with the technicalities of how
quantum systems interacting weakly with a secondary large system (heat
bath) equilibrate and thermalize.97 Essentially what is shown is that the
density operator of the original system ends up (at least most of the time) in
a “Gibbs” (alternatively “Boltzmann”) thermal state, even when the initial
state of the entire system – assumed to be isolated – is pure. Of course
the von-Neumann entropy of the total system is a constant of the motion
under unitary evolution (zero in the case of a pure state) and astonishingly
96Wallace (2013).
97See, e.g., Partovi (1989), Tasaki (1998), Maroney (2008), Linden et al. (2009), (2010),
and Reimann (2010).
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this has led some commentators to argue that an isolated quantum system
never equilibrates.98 This conclusion, if valid, would be disastrous for the
theories of Albert and Wallace we have been discussing, but it is invalid for
essentially the same reasons that the constancy of the fine-grained Gibbs
entropy in classical statistical mechanics for a closed system fails to rule
out spontaneous equilibration. Indeed, there has been significant recent
work on the physics of “quenched”, isolated, quantum many-body systems
that describes irreversible behaviour over times short in comparison with
the recurrence time, work which requires no Gibbsian ensembles and no
appeal to coarse-graining. Spin-1/2 models have been developed with two-
body interactions which describe real materials and which have also been
simulated with optical lattices.99 In quantum field theory, furthermore,
there exist direct analogues of the classical Boltzmann equation and H-
theorem for finite, isolated quantum fields involving interacting particles
(field excitations), and it is this development that I want to concentrate on
briefly.
Over the last thirty five years, it has been possible to test the the quan-
tum Boltzmann equation (QBE) quantitatively in experiments on nonequi-
librium systems. The ability to obtain numerical solutions of the QBE using
iterative methods has resulted from the availability of cheap, fast comput-
ers, and the development of ultrafast optics methods has made observation
possible of the distribution function of carriers in semiconductors, and some
metals, out of equilibrium. The achievement of trapped cold atom gases has
also allowed direct measurement of the distribution function of a gas.
In particular, a very good fit between experiment and theory was re-
ported in 1991 by David Snoke and collaborators in the case of the semi-
conductor Cu2O, where the energy distribution of excitons was measured at
various times (at the picosecond scale) following the preparation of a non-
equilibrium state using a laser pulse. The solution of the QBE for the time
evolution of the population was obtained using a model based on exciton-
phonon scattering.100
A brief and rather informal comparison of the QBE with the classical
Boltzmann equation (CBE) will hopefully suffice to bring out the features
that are relevant to our discussion.101 Recall from section 5.4 that the CBE
98See Partovi op. cit. and Peres (1998), p. 267; for the classical analogue, see Blatt
(1959).
99See, e.g. Torres-Herrera et al. (2016).
100For a review of experimental uses of the quantum Boltzmann equation, see Snoke
(2011).
101For further details see Snoke et al. (2012).
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establishes the rate of change of the velocity density function for the dilute
gas; the contribution made by binary collisions is calculated on the basis of
the SZA assumption, that at every instant the molecules about to collide
are uncorrelated in velocity. In the case of a quantum field, it is assumed
that the original state of the field is pure (but not necessarily a Fock state),
and the rate of change of the expectation value of the number operator Nˆk
associated with each mode ~k is calculated. If the state of the field evolves
from |ψi〉 to |ψt〉 over some period of time t, then
∆〈Nˆk〉 = 〈ψt|Nˆk|ψt〉 − 〈ψi|Nˆk|ψi〉. (2)
Consider the case analogous to the Boltzmann gas where the Hamiltonian
for the system contains a nonlinear number-preserving interaction (mode-
coupling) term which corresponds to the collision of two particles, applying
destruction operators to two modes and creation operators to two other
modes. The quantity ∆〈Nˆk〉 is calculated using time-dependent pertur-
bation theory, and it is assumed that “off-diagonal” terms of the form
〈ψi|a†ka†k3ak2ak1 |ψi〉, with all four ~k’s different, are negligible (where a
†
k and
ak are the creation and annihilation operators associated with the mode ~k,
etc.)102, an assumption referred to as “dephasing”. It is also assumed, in
analogy with Boltzmann’s SZA, that expectation values factorize: 〈Nˆk1Nˆk2〉 =
〈Nˆk1〉〈Nˆk2〉.103 Again, analogously to the Boltzmann case, it is assumed
that energy states are close enough together to allow a sum over discrete ~k
modes to be treated as an integral. If the state |ψi〉 is changing sufficiently
slowly, then an expression for d〈Nˆk〉/dt is obtained; this is the QBE. Given
a standard quantum statistical mechanical formulation of the entropy (the
analogue of minus Boltzmann’s H functional):
S = −kB
∑
k
(
〈Nˆk〉 ln〈Nˆk〉 ∓ (1± 〈Nˆk〉) ln(1± 〈Nˆk〉)
)
, (3)
it follows from the QBE that S is non-decreasing in time (where the upper
sign is for bosons and the lower sign is for fermions) if for every small succes-
sive interval dt, chosen such that the change in 〈Nˆk〉 is small, the dephasing
and factorization conditions are met. This is the quantum analogue of the
Boltzmann H-theorem.
102This expression appears in the second order term in h¯ for ∆〈Nˆk〉; a similar assumption
is also made for higher order terms.
103Snoke et al. (op. cit.) argue (obscurely in my opinion) that factorization holds “on
average”, given dephasing.
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What the equilibrium distribution looks like on this account will be dis-
cussed in the next subsection. At this point it is worth summarising what
the argument involves, in the words of Snoke et al.:
We began with a closed, energy-conserving system, namely a
quantum mechanical field Hamiltonian with no interactions with
any external system, and deduced the expectation values of the
many-body wave function as it evolves deterministically toward
equilibrium according to the proper wave equation; we never in-
voked collapse, measurement, observation, or randomness. From
beginning to end we have treated only the wave function, without
invoking particles at all except to identify them as the natural
energy eigenstates of the system. Yet we get an irreversible,
deterministic approach to equilibrium.104
8.2 Probability again
A difficulty often pointed out in relation to Gibb’s original treatment of
equilibrium statistical mechanics, and its reformulation by Jaynes based on
the maximum entropy principle, is the lack of a clear justification as to
why the procedure works as well as it does. It is remarkable then that
the canonical distribution for a quantum subsystem being thermalized by
interaction with a heat bath can be obtained in quantum mechanics even
when no considerations related to ensembles are introduced at the start of
the analysis.
Wallace has correctly observed that the notion of fluctuations around
equilibrium has different interpretations in the Gibbsian and Boltzmannian
approaches to classical statistical mechanics. In the former, it is related to
a probabilistic feature of the fictitious ensemble representing the system. In
the latter, the consideration is dynamical: the phase point of the system
will supposedly stray in and out of the equilibrium macrostate (i.e. largest
according to the Liouville measure) in the course of the Hamiltonian flow,
though quantitative details of the kind offered by the Gibbsian approach
are lacking.105 What Linden et al. stressed in 2010 is that in the quantum
104Snoke et al. (2012), pp. 1835-6. For the record, I do not find convincing the manner
in which these authors respond in this paper to the Loschmidt reversibility objection, or
the structural distinction they draw between their derivation of the QBE and that of the
CBE. I am also concerned that the justification they provide in part V of their paper for
the dephasing assumption may be inconsistent with the quantum recurrence theorem in
the case of finite systems.
105Wallace (2015a).
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mechanical analysis of the kind mentioned in the previous paragraph, for
most of the time the state of the system is very close to the Gibbs state
and hence almost static; the fluctuations are associated rather with quan-
tum indeterminacies appearing in the standard “uncertainty” relations, and
exposed in the act of measurement of the system.
Similar remarks apply to the distributions that arise from the QBE (as
well as the fluctuations around equilibrium in the quantum quenching mod-
els mentioned earlier). The equilibrium state in the case of two-body elastic
scattering above is that for which d〈Nˆk〉/dt is zero. It can be shown that
when 〈Nˆk〉 is expressed as a function of energy, the equilibrium solution
in the low particle density limit is the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution.106
This is not exactly the standard Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution; it is an
expectation value distribution and allows for fluctuations. (The same applies
to the related derivation of the Planck distribution in the case of electron-
photon interactions.107)
So let us return to Wallace’s analysis of macro-irreversibility in quantum
theory. He states that:
. . . the success of classical statistical mechanics gives us no par-
ticular reason to make the statistical move in the quantum case.
. . . debates about the nature of classical statistical-mechanical
probability are not of direct relevance to our understanding of the
actual world as described by contemporary physics. Probability
in contemporary physics arises from the probabilistic nature of
quantum theory itself, not from any additional posit.108
I think this conclusion is uncontestable, but the question I am interested in
here is whether contemporary physics is relevant to our understanding of
classical statistical-mechanical probability. The considerations in the previ-
ous two paragraphs endorse the Ballentine-Wallace claim (see above) that
the classical limit of quantum mechanics is classical statistical mechanics,
but they refer to the equilibrium case. Regarding non-equilibrium behaviour,
I do not see that Wallace’s own Simple Past Hypothesis in the classical set-
ting is in any straightforward sense the classical limit of the QBE or for that
matter any of the familiar decoherence mechanisms in the literature. The
question hinges on whether the initial Simple quantum state is in itself a
106This distribution will also be obtained in cases involving other interactions, such as
electron-phonon scattering, or exciton-phonon scattering in semiconductors; see Snoke et
al. (2012).
107Op. cit.
108Wallace (2013).
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probabilistic entity. My own view within the (fundamentally deterministic)
Everett picture is that such a density operator – idempotent or otherwise –
is no more intrinsically a carrier of probability than is the Liouville measure
on the classical phase space. Probabilities in my book come into being when
a decision-theoretic agent is confronted with the prospect of branching in
a measurement process, and can only make sense in a world endowed with
a macroscopic arrow of time and with agents who remember the past and
not the future.109 This view implies that quantum probabilities make no
appearance at the start of the world, but are forced on us at the later times
at which observations are made and rational agents have to bet on their
outcomes. I am thus led to doubting whether the initial “vexed” probability
distributions in Wallace’s classical Simple Past Hypothesis find any clarifi-
cation in contemporary quantum physics, as well as doubting whether the
Gibbsian coarse-graining approach to macro-irreversibility is strictly needed
anyway.
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